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Root cause analysis: lessons from medication errors

Root cause analysis - lessons from medication errors

When a medication error happens, the first question is usually "Who made the mistake?" It is the wrong question. Most errors happen when well-trained, careful people work inside systems that make mistakes easy and hard to catch (Kohn et al., 2000).

Root cause analysis (RCA) asks a better question: "Why was this error possible, and why wasn't it stopped?" This article draws on my years in hospital pharmacy, including a surgical unit, to explain how RCA works and why its lessons apply far beyond the hospital.

The Swiss cheese model

The psychologist James Reason described safety systems as slices of Swiss cheese (Reason, 2000). Each slice is a layer of defence: a prescriber, a pharmacist check, a nurse's double-check, a barcode scan. Each slice has holes, which are weaknesses.

Most of the time, the holes don't line up, and one layer catches what another missed. An error reaches the patient only when the holes align. RCA aims to find those holes and close them, not to find someone to blame (Reason, 2000).

Understanding error types

Not all errors are the same, and the right fix depends on the type (Reason, 1990):

  • Slips: the right plan, carried out wrongly, such as picking the wrong strength from a look-alike box.
  • Lapses: a memory failure, such as forgetting to restart a medicine after surgery.
  • Mistakes: the wrong plan, based on incomplete knowledge or a wrong assumption.
  • Violations: deliberate deviations from a procedure, often as workarounds under time pressure.

Slips and lapses are best addressed by changing the system, such as packaging, layout or checklists. Mistakes call for better information and training. Violations often signal that a procedure is impractical and needs redesign.

Where risk concentrates

Some situations and medicines carry more risk than others. In surgical settings, transitions of care are especially vulnerable: from ward to operating theatre, from theatre to recovery, and from hospital to home (World Health Organization [WHO], 2017).

High-alert medications, which can cause serious harm when used in error, include insulin, opioids, anticoagulants and concentrated electrolytes (Institute for Safe Medication Practices [ISMP], 2018). Look-alike, sound-alike drug names and packaging add further risk.

In my work as a hospital pharmacist in the surgery unit of the National Hospital in Moldova, I managed peri-surgical medication provision for post-operative patients and coordinated medication planning with surgical teams. Those transitions are exactly where clear records and communication prevent harm.

How an RCA is carried out

A structured RCA usually follows these steps:

  1. Secure the facts. Protect the patient, preserve records and document what happened while memories are fresh.
  2. Build a timeline. Reconstruct the sequence of events, step by step.
  3. Identify contributing factors. Use tools such as a fishbone diagram, with categories such as people, procedures, materials, equipment, environment and communication.
  4. Ask "why" repeatedly. The "5 Whys" technique moves from the immediate cause to the underlying system causes.
  5. Define actions. Prefer strong actions that change the system, such as removing a hazard, over weak actions such as reminders (National Patient Safety Foundation [NPSF], 2015).
  6. Check effectiveness. Verify later whether the actions actually reduced the risk.

An illustrative example

Consider a typical scenario. A post-operative patient receives a double dose of an anticoagulant.

A blame-focused review stops at "the nurse gave two doses". An RCA continues. Why? Because the anticoagulant was ordered twice: once in the standard post-operative order set and once by a different doctor. Why was the duplication not caught? Because the medication record showed the two orders on different screens. Why was that possible? Because the order set was never updated when the electronic system changed.

The strong action is to fix the order set and add a duplication alert. Retraining one nurse would have left the hole open for the next patient.

Just culture and reporting

RCA only works if people report errors and near misses. That requires a just culture: one that distinguishes between honest human error, at-risk behaviour and reckless behaviour, and responds proportionately to each (Marx, 2001).

In Switzerland, critical incident reporting systems (CIRS) are widely used in hospitals so that lessons from near misses can be shared across teams and institutions (Stiftung Patientensicherheit Schweiz, n.d.).

Beyond the hospital

The same method applies in many settings:

  • Pharmaceutical quality assurance: deviation investigations and CAPAs use the same tools and the same focus on systems.
  • Pharmacovigilance: medication errors that lead to adverse reactions are reported and analysed, and recurring errors with a product can lead to changes in its name, packaging or labelling (European Medicines Agency [EMA], 2015).
  • Health and safety: workplace incident investigations rely on timelines, contributing factors and corrective actions in exactly the same way.

Why this matters to employers

Organisations need people who investigate calmly, look for systemic causes and propose actions that genuinely reduce risk. My experience in hospital pharmacy, where errors have immediate consequences, combined with my training in safety science, has made this way of thinking second nature.

Key takeaways

  • Most errors are system failures; RCA looks for holes in the defences, not people to blame.
  • Strong actions change the system; weak actions rely on memory and reminders.
  • The same RCA method underpins quality, pharmacovigilance and occupational safety.

References

European Medicines Agency. (2015). Good practice guide on risk minimisation and prevention of medication errors (EMA/606103/2014). https://www.ema.europa.eu

Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2018). ISMP list of high-alert medications in acute care settings. https://www.ismp.org

Kohn, L. T., Corrigan, J. M., & Donaldson, M. S. (Eds.). (2000). To err is human: Building a safer health system. National Academies Press.

Marx, D. (2001). Patient safety and the "just culture": A primer for health care executives. Columbia University.

National Patient Safety Foundation. (2015). RCA2: Improving root cause analyses and actions to prevent harm. National Patient Safety Foundation.

Reason, J. (1990). Human error. Cambridge University Press.

Reason, J. (2000). Human error: Models and management. BMJ, 320(7237), 768–770. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768

Stiftung Patientensicherheit Schweiz. (n.d.). [CIRRNET: Critical Incident Reporting & Reacting NETwork]. https://patientensicherheit.ch

World Health Organization. (2017). Medication without harm: WHO global patient safety challenge. World Health Organization.